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INTERPRETING THE NONDISCHARGEABILITY OF DRUNK
DRIVING DEBTS UNDER SECTION 523(a)(9) OF THE




In recent years, our society has been permeated by an impas-
sioned and vociferous movement against drunk driving. This move-
ment has been so effective and influential that it has provoked
numerous and varied statutory responses from legislative bodies
throughout the country.' One of the most provocative responses is
codified in section 523(a)(9) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code (the
Code).2 This provision was added to the Code as a part of the con-
sumer amendments of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984. Section 523(a)(9) attempts to prevent an
individual who has filed a petition in bankruptcy from escaping fi-
nancial liability for debts that he or she may have incurred as a result
of having operated a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated.4
The individual debtor who has filed a bankruptcy petition
* Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America. B.A., Wells College, 1977;J.D., Catholic University of America, 1980.
1. For articles addressing the nationwide legislative responsiveness to the anti-
drunk driving movement, see Bruce & Bruce, The Legislative Response To The Drunk Driving
Dilemma: An Empirical Analysis of Its Success and Failure, 33 ST. Louis U.LJ. 177 (1988);
Joye, Jr., Drunk Driving: Recommendations For Safer Highways, TRIAL, June 1983, at 60;
Note, The National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984: Once Again Congress Mails Home An-
other Fist, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 637 (1985-86); Comment, The Bumper Sticker: The Innova-
tion That Failed, 22 NEw ENG. L. REV. 643 (1988); Comment, DWI Laws: Getting Tough on
Drunks, 28 S.D.L. REV. 491 (1983).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (1988).
3. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 353 (1984).
4. Section 523(a) provides:
A discharge under section 727... of this title does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt-
(9) to any entity, to the extent that such debt arises from a judgment or
consent decree entered in a court of record against the debtor wherein liability
was incurred by such debtor as a result of the debtor's operation of a motor
vehicle while legally intoxicated under the laws or regulations of any jurisdic-
tion within the United States or its territories wherein such motor vehicle was
operated and within which such liability was incurred[.]
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1988).
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under Chapter 7 of the Code5 is the focus of the goals of section
523(a)(9). The bankrupt debtor's objective in seeking relief
through a Chapter 7 liquidation is to settle his or her outstanding
debts by distributing the proceeds from the debtor's nonexempt as-
sets to prepetition creditors, and to be discharged from any further
liability to such creditors.6 This provision of financial relief under
the Code provides the deserving debtor with a clean slate and "fresh
start" and is one of the longstanding and basic tenets of bankruptcy
law.7 An equally important goal of the Code, however, is to assure
fair and equitable treatment of the debtor's creditors: to see that
assets of the debtor are distributed equitably and that the debtor
seeking financial forgiveness is worthy of such relief.' Accordingly,
if the debtor in bankruptcy has engaged in conduct that is unworthy
of discharge or forgiveness, discharge will be denied under the
Code and the debtor will remain financially liable for the debt to the
prepetition creditor.
Section 523 (a)(9) is one of ten exceptions to the debtor's dis-
charge from certain types of debts that are protected under the
Code.9 As noted above, the debtor who has filed a Chapter 7 peti-
5. Id. §§ 701-766 (Chapter 7 liquidation provisions).
6. See B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 1.02[l][a] (rev. ed.
1986).
7. See Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918).
When considering Senate Bill 2266, a precursor of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, the Senate Judiciary Committee characterized the bill as an update of the then
existing Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and further noted that the "substantive law of bank-
ruptcy and current bankruptcy system were designed in 1898." S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5788. In
Steliwagen, the Supreme Court offered the following description of the basic principles of
our federal bankruptcy system under the Bankruptcy Act, the essence of which continues
under the Code:
The federal system of bankruptcy is designed not only to distribute the prop-
erty of the debtor, not by law exempted, fairly and equally among his creditors,
but as a main purpose of the act, intends to aid the unfortunate debtor by giv-
ing him a fresh start in life, free from debts, except of a certain character, after
the property which he owned at the time of bankruptcy has been administered
for the benefit of creditors. Our decisions lay great stress upon this feature of
the law-as one not only of private but of great public interest in that it secures
to the unfortunate debtor, who surrenders his property for distribution, a new
opportunity in life.
Stellwagen, 245 U.S. at 617.
8. See supra note 7.
9. The effect of § 523(a) is to except specific debts of the bankrupt from discharge.
However, under § 727(a) of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988), the debtor may be
denied a discharge from all of his or her debts. The grounds for a complete denial of
discharge under § 727(a) generally are predicated on the debtor's misconduct in the
bankruptcy case. Under this provision, the debtor may be denied a discharge of all of
his or her debts if he or she has: "transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or con-
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tion in bankruptcy does so with the expectation of being discharged
from his or her prepetition debts. The Code, however, does not
permit such a discharge if the debt was incurred by the debtor un-
scrupulously, or if there is some compelling public interest mandat-
ing that the debtor's personal liability for the debt should survive
bankruptcy.' 0 Examples of these types of debts are: tax obliga-
tions;'' outstanding loans incurred by the debtor fraudulently,
through the use of materially false information;' 2 debts that the
debtor knowingly has failed to identify as outstanding in his or her
bankruptcy petition; 13 outstanding alimony or child support obliga-
tions; 4 debts resulting from the debtor's "willful and malicious in-
jury" of another entity or its property;' 5 or outstanding educational
loans that were funded by governmental units or non-profit
organizations. 1 6
The addition of subsection (a)(9) to section 523 similarly re-
flects Congress' intention to protect the public interest by providing
victims of drunk drivers with some assurance of financial reparation
for injuries sustained as a result of the driver's action. It also serves
as a sanction against a debtor's wrongful conduct in having driven a
motor vehicle while intoxicated. In both respects, section 523(a)(9)
cealed" property within a year prior to the bankruptcy with the "intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody of property under
this title," id. § 727(a)(2); "concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or
preserve any recorded information .. .from which the debtor's financial condition or
business transactions might be ascertained," id. § 727(a)(3); knowingly and fraudulently
made a false oath, false account, false claim, or given or received a bribe or withheld
records, id. § 727(a)(4); or failed to "explain satisfactorily" a loss of assets. Id.
§ 727(a)(5).
10. One commentator states:
The policy of relief to beleaguered debtors is a highly important one in bank-
ruptcy .... This policy is not so important, however, as to negate other impor-
tant policies which the law feels a responsibility to foster and abet. In general,
the two bases of policy upon which exceptions of Section 523 of the Code ap-
pear to be founded are: (1) that the debtor should not be relieved of his finan-
cial responsibility to those who have a high moral claim upon him due to their
dependence upon him or their weak bargaining position in relation to him or
perhaps both; and (2) that the relief of discharge is intended for the honest and
thus certain debts created by the debtor's unlawful or oppressive conduct
should remain his obligations.
1 D. COWAN, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.2, at 691-92 (rev. ed. 1989).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (1988).
12. Id. § 523(a)(2).
13. Id. § 523(a)(3).
14. Id. § 523(a)(5).
15. Id. § 523(a)(6).
16. Id. § 523(a)(8).
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demonstrates legislative responsiveness to a national movement
against drunk driving.
Although section 523(a)(9) is a laudable example of positive
and innovative anti-drunk driving legislation, it exhibits a certain
weakness in draftsmanship. This weakness has resulted in a poten-
tial loophole through which debtors have attempted to avoid finan-
cial responsibility for drunk driving liability, and has created
"legitimate debate" for the courts in interpreting and applying the
provision. 17 As section 523(a)(9) is written, a debtor will not be en-
titled to discharge from such debt if (1) it "arises from a judgment
or consent decree entered in a court of record" and if (2) it "was
incurred by such debtor as a result of the debtor's operation of a
motor vehicle while legally intoxicated."' 8 Accordingly, for a debt
to meet the requirements for nondischargeability under subsection
(a)(9), it must arise from a "judgment or consent decree entered in a
court of record" and there must be proof that the debtor was "le-
gally intoxicated" while operating the motor vehicle for which the
debt was incurred.19
It is in the first of these requirements, that the debt arise from a
"judgment or consent decree," that some debtors have attempted
to create a loophole to avoid the nondischargeability of debts aris-
ing from liability for drunk driving. To this end, debtors have filed
their petitions in bankruptcy before drunk driving victims (credi-
tors)20 have been able to obtain a judgment or consent decree
against them. 2 The debtors in these cases have argued that a credi-
17. See Young v. Rose (In re Rose), 86 Bankr. 86, 88-89 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988)
(noting different judicial interpretations of § 523(a)(9)).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (1988).
19. Id.
20. The term "creditor" is defined under the Code to include any "entity that has a
claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concern-
ing the debtor." Id. § 101(9). This would include any individual seeking damages
against a debtor for any injuries or losses sustained as a result of the debtor's drunk
driving.
21. See Stackhouse v. Hudson (In re Hudson), 859 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir. 1988)
[hereinafter Hudson 1I] (debtor filed bankruptcy petition one day before trial in which
debtor was sued for injuries from debtor's drunken driving); Burch v. Tyler (In re Tyler),
98 Bankr. 396, 399 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1989) (debtor filed for bankruptcy before his drunk
driving victim could obtain ajudgment in state court); Bryant v. Straup (In re Straup), 90
Bankr. 481, 482 (D. Utah 1988) (debtor filed his bankruptcy petition after his default
had been entered in a civil action by a victim of his drunk driving, but prior to the entry
of a default judgment against him); Rose, 86 Bankr. at 87 (before debtor filed a bank-
ruptcy petition, debtor's drunk driving victim filed a state court action against debtor);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith (In re Smith), 83 Bankr. 433, 434 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988)
(debtor filed bankruptcy petition after debtor's insurance company filed a subrogation
claim against him for money it paid out on his behalf for injuries caused by his drunken
159
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tor who petitions the court for relief, without ajudgment or consent
decree from a court of record, is ineligible for relief under section
523(a)(9).22 A majority of the bankruptcy courts considering these
cases have rejected this argument and have permitted creditors to
seek relief under section 523(a)(9) without a prepetition judgment
or consent decree against the debtor.23 These courts have looked to
selected congressional testimony regarding section 523(a)(9) to
deemphasize the significance of the "plain language" of the provi-
sion and have deemed section 523(a)(9) to be an unfortunate exam-
ple of "inartful draftsmanship. '"24
While the courts have taken this view to prevent the fast and
clever debtor from avoiding the financial liability that section
523(a)(9) is designed to preserve, one cannot help but question
whether these courts have ventured out of the realm of judicial in-
terpretation and into that ofjudicial legislation. Discomfort with the
court's position is not unwarranted in a time in which judicial re-
straint in statutory construction is a common course of conduct ad-
vocated by our higher courts.2 5
driving); Jones v. Hager (In re Jones), 80 Bankr. 974, 975 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (drunk driv-
ing victim filed state court action against debtor before debtor filed a petition for bank-
ruptcy); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 74 Bankr. 463,
464 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987) (debtor filed a bankruptcy petition after debtor's insurance
company filed a subrogation claim for money it paid out on his behalf for injuries caused
by his drunk driving); Leach v. Reckley (In re Leach), 63 Bankr. 724, 725 (S.D. Ind. 1986)
(debtor filed for bankruptcy before his drunk driving victim could obtain a judgment
against him in state court); Thomas v. Ganzer (In re Ganzer), 54 Bankr. 75, 76 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1985) (drunk driving victim sued debtor in state court, but prior to judgment
debtor filed for bankruptcy); Searight v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 51 Bankr. 187, 189
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (debtor filed for bankruptcy three weeks prior to state court
trial); Avitto v. Cardona (In re Cardona), 50 Bankr. 596, 597 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985)
(victim of debtor's drunk driving had a pending tort action in state court when debtor
filed bankruptcy petition).
22. See Hudson H, 859 F.2d at 1419; Tyler, 98 Bankr. at 398; Straup, 90 Bankr. at 482;
Rose, 86 Bankr. at 87; Smith, 83 Bankr. at 434;Jones, 80 Bankr. at 975; Anderson, 74 Bankr.
at 464; Leach, 63 Bankr. at 726; Ganzer, 54 Bankr. at 76; Thomas, 51 Bankr. at 188.
23. See Hudson H, 859 F.2d at 1424; Tyler, 98 Bankr. at 398; Straup, 90 Bankr. at 484;
Rose, 86 Bankr. at 91; Smith, 83 Bankr. at 436;Jones, 80 Bankr. at 976; Anderson, 74 Bankr.
at 464; Leach, 63 Bankr. at 727; Ganzer, 54 Bankr. at 77; Thomas, 51 Bankr. at 189;
Cardona, 50 Bankr. at 597. But see Stackhouse v. Hudson (In re Hudson), 73 Bankr. 649
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Hudson I] (requiring creditors to obtain prepetition
judgment for damages against debtor as prerequisite to having debts declared nondis-
chargeable), rev'd, 859 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1988).
24. See cases cited supra note 22.
25. The dissenting opinion in Hudson IH cites Justice Marshall on the appropriate
exercise of statutory construction in United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985). 859
F.2d at 1427 (Wiggins,J., dissenting). In his opinion,Justice Marshall stated that courts
do not have "carte blanche to redraft statutes in an effort to achieve that which Congress is
perceived to have failed to do," and that it is not a court's responsibility to "soften the
160
1990] NONDISCHARGEABILITY OF DRUNK DRIVING DEBTS 161
Only one federal circuit court has considered the question
whether a creditor without a prepetition judgment or consent de-
cree is eligible for relief under section 523(a)(9). In Stackhouse v.
Hudson (In re Hudson) (Hudson I),26 a Ninth Circuit Court majority
elected to follow the lower bankruptcy courts in de-emphasizing the
plain language of the provision to prevent "quick-thinking debtors"
from escaping financial liability for drunk driving.27 The compelling
and persuasive dissenting opinion in Hudson H criticized the major-
ity's judicial legislating, charging that it interpreted section
523(a) (9) in a manner that was contrary to the wording of the provi-
sion, and thus, violated principles of statutory construction. 28 The
dissent also provoked a valid challenge to the majority's interpreta-
tion of congressional intent in enacting section 523(a)(9), and main-
tained that a prepetition judgment or consent decree against the
debtor was necessary for relief under the provision.29
This article presents a critical analysis of section 523(a)(9) and
explores the appropriate limits of statutory construction in the judi-
cial interpretations of the provision. Part I of the article includes a
discussion of the history of section 523(a)(9) and why it was neces-
sary for Congress to enact a special anti-drunk driving provision to
assure that bankrupts could not escape financial liability for drunk
driving debts under the Code. This section also will address how
the addition of section 523(a)(9) has expanded and affected the op-
tions for nondischargeability determinations under the Code. Part
II focuses on the (1) "inartfully drafted" language of section
523(a)(9), (2) the loophole that debtors have attempted to forge to
escape liability thereunder, and (3) the case law interpreting section
523(a)(9) in response to this loophole. This article will show that it
is an inappropriate exercise of statutory construction for courts to
interpret section 523(a)(9) on the basis of "presumed" congres-
clear import of Congress' chosen words whenever a court believes those words lead to a
harsh result." Locke, 471 U.S. at 95 (citations omitted). He noted that "deference to the
supremacy of the Legislature, as well as recognition that Congressmen typically vote on
the language of a bill, generally requires [courts] to assume that 'the legislative purpose
is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.' " Id. (citations omitted).
Several federal circuit courts have followed Locke in applying these principles in
interpreting congressional legislation. See United States v. Lund, 853 F.2d 242, 247 (4th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Mollica, 849 F.2d 723 (2nd Cir. 1988); Miller v. Comm'r,
836 F.2d 1274, 1285 (10th Cir. 1988); Amalgamated Transit Union v. Brock, 809 F.2d
909, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
26. 859 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1988).
27. Id. at 1420.
28. Id. at 1424-28 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1426.
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sional intent, as opposed to the literal language of the provision in
an effort to overcome the weakness of the "inartfully drafted" lan-
guage of section 523(a)(9). 31
I. THE LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 523(a)(9)
Section 523(a)(9) was added to the Code to fill a void in the
debt discharge exceptions that existed before its enactment under
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.
Prior to 1984, a creditor could seek only a nondischargeability de-
termination against a debtor for a drunk driving debt under section
523(a)(6) of the Code.3' Under section 523(a)(6), a debtor is not
discharged of a debt resulting from the debtor's "willful and mali-
cious injury . . . to another entity or to the property of another
entity. "32
The creditor's burden of proving that the debtor engaged in
"willful and malicious" conduct by driving a motor vehicle while
drunk or legally intoxicated is difficult in most cases;3 3 the courts
have split as to whether drunk driving constitutes "willful and mali-
cious" conduct under section 523(a)(6).34 Application by the courts
of different legal standards to determine whether a debtor's conduct
was willful and malicious is the basis for the split among the
30. Id. at 1424.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988).
32. Id.
33. The legislative history of § 523(a)(9) revealed:
Under present law [section 523(a) (6)], a debt that is the result of a tortious
act-such as a judgment against a debtor as the result of an automobile acci-
dent-is non-dischargeable only if the debt is the result of a "willful and mali-
cious injury" to the property or person of another.
In most states, an injury resulting from an act of drunk driving will sup-
port a finding only of negligence on the part of the driver. Thus, more often
than not, the debt is discharged-unless the bankruptcy court finds that the act
of drunk driving was a willful and malicious act by the nature of the circum-
stances surrounding it.
S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1983).
34. Some cases held that a debtor's intention to drive a motor vehicle while legally
intoxicated constituted willful and malicious conduct under § 523(a)(6). See Caldarelli v.
Callaway (In re Callaway), 41 Bankr. 341, 346 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Burns v. Cloutier
(In re Cloutier), 33 Bankr. 18, 20 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); Brawner v. Askew (In re Askew),
22 Bankr. 641, 643 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd without opinion, 705 F.2d 469 (1 lth Cir.
1983); Long v. Greenwell (In re Greenwell), 21 Bankr. 419, 421 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Cases
taking a contrary position required proof of intent to injure another in order to satisfy
the willful and malicious intent requirement of subsection (a)(6). See In re Maney, 23
Bankr. 61, 62 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1982); Castiglia v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 22 Bankr.
38, 39 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982); Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. Naser (In re Naser), 7 Bankr. 116,
118 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1980); Williams v. Bryson (In re Bryson), 3 Bankr. 593, 596
(Bankr. N.D. Il. 1980).
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courts.3 5 One view is that the creditor must provide evidence suffi-
cient to show that the debtor intended to injure someone.3 6 Under
this standard, evidence that a debtor has driven a motor vehicle
while drunk or legally intoxicated, without more, is not sufficient
evidence that the debtor intended to injure anyone.3 7 The other
view is that intent to specifically injure someone is not necessary; the
creditor need only prove that the debtor intended to engage in a
wrongful act.38 Under the latter view, evidence that a debtor caused
injury to the creditor as a result of voluntarily drinking and operat-
ing a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol is sufficient
to show the required intent under section 523(a)(6). 9
Section 523(a)(9) was enacted to resolve the uncertainty sur-
rounding the nondischargeability of drunk driving debts under the
Code. Congressman Rodino, the Chairman of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, stated that "[section 523(a)(9)] clarifie[d] pres-
ent law relating to the nondischargeability of debts incurred by
drunk drivers," and that "[d]ebts incurred by persons driving while
intoxicated are presumed to be willfully and maliciously incurred under this
provision. "40
Unfortunately, the addition of subsection (a)(9) to section 523
has not resolved all of the interpretive difficulties courts face in de-
termining the nondischargeability of drunk driving debts under sub-
section (a)(6). These interpretive difficulties have resulted in a split
between federal circuit courts over whether subsection (a)(9)
"clarifie[s]" the treatment of drunk driving debts at bankruptcy so
35. The legislative history of § 523(a)(6) provided that the "willful and malicious"
standard that is required under the provision involves conduct by the debtor that is
"deliberate or intentional," and something more than a "reckless disregard" standard.
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5787, 5865; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 365, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6320-21.
36. See Maney, 23 Bankr. at 62; Morgan, 22 Bankr. at 39; Naser, 7 Bankr. at 118; Bryson,
3 Bankr. at 596.
37. One court, interpreting the standard, stated: "Here the defendant showed reck-
less disregard. He was drunk when he ran into the plaintiff. But there is no evidence
that the defendant intended to injure anyone. His conduct cannot be described as 'will-
ful and malicious' under § 523(a)(6)." Bryson, 3 Bankr. at 596.
38. See Callaway, 41 Bankr. at 346 (driving in intoxicated state sufficiently intentional
and deliberate); Cloutier, 33 Bankr. at 20 (debtor cannot claim that he did not intend to
cause some injury); Prosch v. Wooten (In re Wooten), 30 Bankr. 357, 358 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1983) (personal ill will towards the injured party is not a requirement); Askew, 22
Bankr. at 642 (whether person does something intentionally can only be determined by
his conduct); Greenwell, 21 Bankr. at 421 (not necessary that personal ill will exist).
39. See, e.g., Calaway, 41 Bankr. at 346 (voluntary act of drinking and driving suffi-
ciently intentional).
40. 130 CONG. REC. H7489 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (emphasis added).
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that such conduct constitutes "willful and malicious injury" under
subsection (a)(6).4 This point of contention is relevant to any dis-
41. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was the first circuit court to interpret
the impact that the newly enacted subsection (a)(9) would have on nondischargeability
determinations of drunk drivers' debts under subsection (a)(6). In Moraes v. Adams (In
re Adams), 761 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1985), the court held that subsection (a)(9) clarified
the law regarding the nondischargeability of drunk drivers' debts under the Code. Id. at
1427. Thus, driving while intoxicated would satisfy the "willful and malicious" standard
under subsection (a)(6):
Whether driving while intoxicated-with or without knowledge of the probable
consequences-constitutes conduct that is "willful" and "malicious" would
present a close question if we were limited in our interpretation of section
523(a)(6) to the language of that subsection and the legislative history in exist-
ence at the time the matter was decided in the district court. However, two
months after judgment was entered Congress answered the question in the
form of an amendment to Title 11. In July of 1984, Congress enacted 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) which, in our view, prescribes the manner in which we must
construe section 523(a)(6). Section 523(a)(9) provides explicitly that debts
arising from liabilities incurred as a result of drunk driving are nondischarge-
able. The legislative history underlying the 1984 amendment makes it clear
that by enacting the amendment, Congress intended to clarify pre-existing law
In addition to the expression of Congressional intent underlying section
523(a)(9), we are influenced by the fact that at the time that amendment was
enacted there was a clear conflict among the nisi prius courts, in this case the
bankruptcy courts, over the meaning of section 523(a)(6). With respect to stat-
utory construction, we view conflict among courts as an indication that a subse-
quent amendment is intended to clarify, rather than change, the existing law.
Accordingly, we construe section 523(a)(6) in light of the clarification of con-
gressional intent provided by section 523(a)(9).
... [W]e hold that the voluntary acts of drinking and driving while intoxi-
cated constitute conduct sufficiently intentional to support a finding of willful-
ness and malice, as contemplated by section 523(a)(6) and that this
interpretation must be given retroactive application.
Id. at 1426-27 (footnote and citations omitted).
In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fielder (In re Fielder), 799 F.2d 656 (11 th Cir.
1986), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with this interpretation of
subsection (a)(9) and its impact on subsection (a)(6), having "look[ed] to § 523(a)(9)
just as the Ninth Circuit did in In reAdams, as a clarification of and not as an 180 degree
turn from the law as it existed prior to the enactment of § 523(a)(9)." Id. at 661.
Two other circuit courts, however, have disagreed with the interpretation of the
Adams court. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Farmers Ins. Group v.
Compos (In re Compos), 768 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1985), interpreted the willful and
malicious requirement of subsection (a)(6) as requiring "proof of an intent to injure
before a debt can be held to be nondischargeable," and held that subsection (a)(6)
"does not except from discharge intentional acts which cause injury." Id. at 1158-59.
Accordingly, evidence of driving while intoxicated, without proving any intent to injure
by the debtor, was insufficient to meet the willful and malicious standard. Id. at 1159. In
Cassidy v. Minihan, 794 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1986), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit followed the Eleventh Circuit in similarly rejecting the holding of Adams:
We are aware of the Ninth Circuit's contrary view expressed in In re Adams.
That court concluded that the subsequent amendment to the Code, especially
in light of the existing division among the authorities, should be viewed as an
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cussion of the nondischargeability of drunk driving debts under the
Code, as cases involving requests for such determinations under
section 523(a)(6) have continued to surface even after section
523(a)(9) became effective. Although section 523(a)(9) is the pri-
mary provision under which nondischargeability requests and deter-
minations are made, relief under subsection (a)(6) may be sought
concurrently with subsection (a)(9) when the creditor is uncertain as
to whether the circumstances supporting his or her request for relief
meet all of the requirements of subsection (a)(9).42
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 523(a)(9)
A. Limiting the Loophole
While section 523(a)(6) continues to be an option for creditors
with claims against bankrupts for drunk driving debts, the majority
of the cases involving the nondischargeability of such debts are de-
cided under section 523(a)(9).43 For a debt to be nondischargeable
attempt to clarify the intent of the 1978 Congress. We decline, however, to
follow that approach, which essentially renders section (a)(9) retroactively ap-
plicable. Section 523(a)(9) added a new exception to discharge, it did not
amend the provision which is here in dispute. While a broader reading of sec-
tion 523(a)(6) may to some yield a salutary outcome in cases dealing with
drunk-driving, we must defer to the intent of the Congress drafting section
523(a)(6) and accord it a narrow interpretation.
Id. at 344 n.7.
42. In Milam v. Vorek (In re Vorek), 95 Bankr. 599, 604 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1989),
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wright (In re Wright), 66 Bankr. 403, 407 (Bankr. S.D.
Ind. 1986), and Hale v. Frazee (In re Frazee), 60 Bankr. 109, 111 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1986), the creditor was unable to provide evidence that the debtor was legally intoxi-
cated while operating the motor vehicle as required under § 523(a)(9). Because the
creditor in these cases sought relief under both subsections (a)(9) and (a)(6) of § 523,
the court in each case was able to consider the question of nondischargeability under
both provisions. See Vorek, 95 Bankr. at 604-05; Wright, 66 Bankr. at 406-07; Frazee, 60
Bankr. at 110.
'The court in City of Akron v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 77 Bankr. 120 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1987), noted that even though a drunk driving debt may not satisfy the require-
ments for nondischargeability under subsection (a)(9), the debt may be nondischarge-
able under subsection (a)(6). Id. at 123. Similarly, the court in Bippus v. Moore (In re
Moore), 53 Bankr. 259 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985), stated that "[t]he enactment of
§ 523(a)(9) does not preclude a claimant from proceeding under § 523(a)(6) for relief in
a drunk driving situation." Id. at 261.
43. See Hudson II, 859 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir. 1988); Burch v. Tyler (In re Tyler),
98 Bankr. 396, 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); Vorek, 95 Bankr. at 600; Bryant v. Straup (In
re Straup), 90 Bankr. 481, 482 (D. Utah 1988); Young v. Rose (In re Rose), 86 Bankr. 86,
87 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith (In re Smith), 83 Bankr. 433, 434
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988); Harrison v. Brunson (In re Brunson), 82 Bankr. 634, 635
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988); Government Employers Ins. Co. v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 80
Bankr. 800, 800 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988); Williams v. Hart (In re Hart), 83 Bankr. 840, 841
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987); General Casualty Co. v. Keating (In re Keating), 80 Bankr. 115,
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under section 523(a)(9), two requirements must be present in the
creditor's petition for relief: (1) The creditor must have obtained a
judgment or consent decree, issued by a court of record, against the
debtor for a debt resulting from the debtor's operation of a motor
vehicle, and (2) the creditor must establish that the motor vehicle
was operated by the debtor while he or she was "legally intoxicated
under the laws or regulations of any jurisdiction within the United
States or its territories wherein such motor vehicle was operated and
within which such liability was incurred. 44 To satisfy the second
requirement of section 523(a)(9), the creditor generally will only
need to prove that at the time of the accident, the debtor was "le-
gally intoxicated" as defined by the laws of the state in which the
accident occurred.
4 5
116 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Christiansen (In re Christian-
sen), 80 Bankr. 481, 481 (W.D. Mo. 1987);Jones v. Hager (In reJones), 80 Bankr. 974,
974 (W.D. Mo. 1987); Sickel v. Pahule (In re Pahule), 78 Bankr. 210, 210 (E.D. Wis.
1987), aft'd, 849 F.2d 1056 (7th Cir. 1988);Jackson, 77 Bankr. at 124; American Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 74 Bankr. 463, 463 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987); Hoover
v. Gomez (In re Gomez), 70 Bankr. 96, 97 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); Gray v. Lewis (In re
Lewis), 69 Bankr. 600, 600 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); Wright, 66 Bankr. at 407; Leach v.
Reckley (In re Leach), 63 Bankr. 724, 725 (S.D. Ind. 1986); Frazee, 60 Bankr. at 110;
Thomas v. Ganzer (In re Ganzer), 54 Bankr. 75, 76 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); Moore, 53
Bankr. at 260; Searight v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 51 Bankr. 187, 188 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1985); Dougherty v. Brackett (In re Dougherty), 51 Bankr. 987, 988 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1985); Avitto v. Cardona (In re Cardona), 50 Bankr. 596, 598 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985);
Brunswick v. Cunningham (In re Cunningham), 48 Bankr. 641, 642 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1985).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9)(1988).
45. See Vorek, 95 Bankr. at 604-05; Brunson, 82 Bankr. at 636; Keating, 80 Bankr. at
1 18-19;Jones, 80 Bankr. at 978; Hart, 83 Bankr. at 842; Gomez, 70 Bankr. at 98; Lewis, 69
Bankr. at 601; Dougherty, 51 Bankr. at 989.
A few courts, however, have required that the creditor not only prove that the
debtor was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident, but that the debtor's legal
intoxication was the cause of the accident. See Ross v. Carney (In re Carney), 68 Bankr.
655, 658 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986); Christiansen, 80 Bankr. at 482-83; Wright, 66 Bankr. at
407. These cases appear to be in the minority in this interpretation.
Courts taking the majority view have interpreted the language of subsection (a)(9)
differently. In Keating, the court stated that "[t]he phrase 'while legally intoxicated'
modifies the word 'operation', denoting only a condition in existence at the time of
operation. If the condition exists at that moment, inquiry need go no further." Keating,
80 Bankr. at 118. The court in Keating noted that while subsection (a)(9) was intended to
prevent drunk drivers from escaping financial liability for their actions under the Code,
it was also designed to "create an objective standard to determine nondischargeability in
drunk driving cases." Id. The court also argued that if the provision required proof that
the debtor's intoxication caused the accident, bankruptcy courts would have to make the
same kind of "case by case fact determinations" in drunk driving cases that had been
necessary under the "willful and malicious" standard of subsection (a)(6), which Con-
gress no longer intended with the enactment of subsection (a)(9). Id.; see also Jones, 80
Bankr. at 977-78 (bankruptcy court need only resolve intoxication issue to extent of
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The first requirement of section 523(a)(9) presents the courts
with an intriguing interpretive challenge. In numerous bankruptcy
cases, the debtor facing potential financial liability for drunk driving
has filed a petition in bankruptcy before the creditor has been able
to obtain a judgment or consent decree against the debtor from a
court of record.4 6 These cases have confronted the courts with the
task of determining whether the absence of a judgment or consent
decree at the time that the petition is filed renders the creditor ineli-
gible for relief under section 523(a)(9).47Although the courts have permitted creditors without prepeti-
tion judgments or consent decrees to seek relief under subsection
(a)(9), they have had to justify this allowance on selective readings
of congressional intent as opposed to the language of the provi-
sion.4" One of the first cases to confront this situation was Seafight v.
Thomas (In re Thomas).4 9 In its interpretation of the "judgment and
consent decree" requirement of section 523(a)(9), the court stated
that Congress is not always the "artful drafter of legislation," and
that "[f]rom a plain reading [of the provision], it would indeed ap-
pear that the claim against an intoxicated driver must be reduced to
judgment or consent.prior to the offender's bankruptcy."' 5° The
court, however, refused to interpret section 523(a)(9) as requiring a
prepetition judgment or consent decree, because it would give
"quickthinking drunks or their attorneys" a means of escaping lia-
bility by racing to file a bankruptcy petition before an injured party
could obtain a judgment against the debtor.5 ' The court held that
whether debtor was legally intoxicated); Gomez, 70 Bankr. at 98 (court did not require
causation as necessary element to establish nondischargeability).
46. See, e.g., Hudson 11, 859 F.2d at 1419; Tyler, 98 Bankr. at 397; Straup, 90 Bankr. at
482; Rose, 86 Bankr. at 87; Smith, 83 Bankr. at 434;Jones, 80 Bankr. at 975; Anderson, 74
Bankr. at 463-64; City of Akron v.Jackson (In reJackson), 77 Bankr. 120, 121-22 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1987); Leach, 63 Bankr. at 725; Ganzer, 54 Bankr. at 76; Thomas, 51 Bankr. at
188.
47. See Hudson 11, 859 F.2d at 1423-24; Tyler, 98 Bankr. at 398; Straup, 90 Bankr. at
484; Rose, 86 Bankr. at 91; Smith, 83 Bankr. at 435;Jones, 80 Bankr. at 975; City of Akron
v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 77 Bankr. 120, 122-23 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Anderson, 74 Bankr.
at 464; Leach, 63 Bankr. at 726-27; Ganzer, 54 Bankr. at 76-77; Thomas, 51 Bankr. at 188-
89.
48. See Hudson M, 859 F.2d at 1420-23; Tyler, 98 Bankr. at 398-99; Straup, 90 Bankr. at
483; Rose, 86 Bankr. at 91; Smith, 83 Bankr. at 435;Jones, 80 Bankr. at 975-76; Anderson,
74 Bankr. at 464;Jackson, 77 Bankr. at 122-23 (dicta); Leach, 63 Bankr. at 726; Ganzer, 54
Bankr. at 76-77; Thomas, 51 Bankr. at 188-89.
49. 51 Bankr. 187 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985).
50. Id. at 188 (emphasis in original).
51. Id. at 188-89. The court also noted that given that it takes a considerably longer
time to obtain a judgment than it takes to file for bankruptcy, the injured party cannot
prevail "absent a dilatory debtor." Id. at 189.
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Congress could not have intended this result, reasoning that it was
unlikely that Congress attempted "to remedy a national problem
and then failed at it.''52
The same views were expressed by the court in Thomas v. Ganzer
(In re Ganzer).5" The Ganzer court noted that the language of subsec-
tion (a)(9) "arguably supports the conclusion that a prepetition
judgment or consent decree is required to make the exception to
discharge applicable."15 4 In spite of the literal language of the provi-
sion, the court was compelled to look beyond this language to the
"presumed" congressional intent:
Presumably, Congressional intent in enacting 11
U.S.C. section 523(a)(9) was to preclude a debtor's dis-
charge from liability on a claim arising out of the operation
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. If
a prepetition judgment determining liability to have been
incurred by the debtor under such circumstances, be re-
quired, the statute is practically useless. Only in cases of
legal malpractice will prepetition judgments ever be en-
tered. This Court will not presume Congress to have in-
tended to sabotage its legislation and create such an
absurdity.55
The court in Blackmer v. Richards (In re Richards)56 also followed
this view, recognizing that the wording of section 523(a)(9) "appar-
ently requires the reduction of a claim against an intoxicated driver
to judgment or consent decree prior to the [debtor's] bank-
ruptcy. '57 As with the aforementioned cases, the Richards court re-
jected the plain language of section 523(a)(9) on the grounds that
such a reading would "emasculate the expressed concern of Con-
gress." '5' Accordingly, the court held that it would permit "judg-
ments or consent decrees to be entered post-petition, so long as
[they were] grounded upon pre-petition claims." 59
The cases discussed above are representative of how a majority
52. Id. at 189. The court stated that "[n]othing in the Congressional intent reflects a
wish to so impede an injured party. I believe [section 523(a)(9)] means if the injured
creditor can obtain a consent or a judgment in state court based on legal intoxication,
the debt is nondischargeable." Id.
53. 54 Bankr. 75 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
54. Id. at 76.
55. Id. at 76-77.
56. 59 Bankr. 541 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1986).
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of the courts have addressed the question of whether a creditor
must have a prepetition judgment or consent decree against a
debtor to be eligible for relief under section 523(a)(9).6 ° As indi-
cated in these cases, the courts were consistent in recognizing that
the literal language of section 523(a)(9) requires that a creditor's
claim for nondischargeability be based on a prepetition judgment or
consent decree against the debtor that has been issued by a court of
record.6 ' In spite of this acknowledgment, these courts gave little
deference to the literal language of the statute. They proceeded to
grant creditors, who did not have prepetition judgments or consent
decrees against debtors, relief from the automatic stay to obtain
post-petition judgments or consent decrees against the debtor, thus
permitting these creditors to seek relief under section 523(a)(9). 62
These courts have justified this position based on a selective reading
of congressional intent and legislative history.6" The courts also ar-
gued that requiring a prepetition judgment or consent decree for
60. See Hudson II, 859 F.2d 1418, 1419-24 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[d]runk driving claim
need not be reduced to judgment or consent decree before debtor files for bankruptcy
... to have consequent debt declared nondischargeable"); Burch v. Tyler (In re Tyler),
98 Bankr. 396, 397-99 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) ("accident victims claim, arising out of
debtor's operation of motor vehicle while intoxicated, was not dischargeable.., even
though no civil judgment had yet been obtained against debtor"); Bryant v. Straup (In re
Straup), 90 Bankr. 481, 482-84 (D. Utah 1988) (allowing "judgments or consent decrees
relating to debts from drunk driving accidents to be entered post-petition"); Young v.
Rose (In re Rose), 86 Bankr. 86, 87-92 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) (§ 523(a)(9) does not
require judgment to be entered before bankruptcy petition is filed for drunk driving
debt to be nondischargeable); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith (In re Smith), 83 Bankr. 433,
434-36 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) (same); Jones v. Hager (In re Jones), 80 Bankr. 974,
975-76 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (same); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson (In re An-
derson), 74 Bankr. 463, 463-65 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987) (withholding further action in
nondischargeability proceeding arising out of debtor's alleged operation of motor vehi-
cle while intoxicated, until injured party had obtained judgment in state court suit);
Leach v. Reckley (In re Leach), 63 Bankr. 724, 725-27 (S.D. Ind. 1986) (§ 532(a)(9) avail-
able to claimants who have not reduced their claims to judgment or consent decree
before the debtor files bankruptcy petition); Thomas v. Ganzer (In re Ganzer), 54 Bankr.
75, 75-77 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (same); Searight v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 51 Bankr.
187, 188-89 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (same); Dougherty v. Brackett (In re Dougherty), 51
Bankr. 987, 988-89 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) (same).
61. See Hudson 11, 859 F.2d at 1419, 1424; Straup, 90 Bankr. at 482; Rose, 86 Bankr. at
87-88; Smith, 83 Bankr. at 434; Thomas, 51 Bankr. at 188.
62. See Tyler, 98 Bankr. at 398-99; Straup, 90 Bankr. at 484; Rose, 86 Bankr. at 9 1-92;
Smith, 83 Bankr. at 436;Jones, 80 Bankr. at 976, 978; Anderson, 74 Bankr. at 464-65; Leach,
63 Bankr. at 725; Ganzer, 54 Bankr. at 77; Thomas, 51 Bankr. at 189; Dougherty, 51 Bankr.
at 989. But see City of Akron v.Jackson (In re Jackson), 77 Bankr. 120, 124 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1987) (potential debt discharged because creditor had not filed state action before
debtor filed bankruptcy petition).
63. See Hudson H, 859 F.2d at 1421-23; Tyler, 98 Bankr. at 397-98; Rose, 86 Bankr. at
90-91; Thomas, 51 Bankr. at 188-89.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
relief under section 523(a)(9) permitted a clever and swift debtor to
escape potential liability for drunk driving by racing to file a petition
in bankruptcy before an injured victim was able to obtain a judg-
ment or consent decree against the debtor from a court of record.'
In spite of the judicious approach that these courts have taken
to prevent debtors from effectuating a loophole in section 523 (a) (9),
a few courts have been more troubled by the willingness to ignore
the language of the statute. This minority has either rejected the
decision of the majority to dismiss the plain language of section
523(a)(9), or they have elected to qualify their willingness to follow
the majority in cases with special distinctions.
City of Akron v. Jackson (In reJackson)65 is one case in which the
court refused to ignore completely the language of section
523(a)(9).66 In determining whether section 523(a) (9) required that
a debt be reduced to judgment prior to the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy, the court held that the language of the provision
"clearly describe[d] the subject debt as one arising from ajudgment
or consent decree." 67 The court noted that in all of the majority
cases choosing to ignore or to take a "relaxed interpretation of this
requirement," there was a factual distinction that made their deci-
sion not to defer to the literal language of section 523(a)(9) less
troublesome than in the facts before it. 6 8 In each of those cases, the
creditors seeking relief under section 523(a)(9) had at least com-
menced a civil action against the debtor prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition;69 whereas in Jackson, the creditor did not have a
civil action pending against the debtor at the time the bankruptcy
petition was filed. 7' This distinction was critical to the court's inter-
pretation of the "judgment or consent decree ' 7 requirement of
section 523(a)(9), and the extent to which the court would relax its
reading of the plain language of the statute:
The express language of the statute requires that the debt
64. See Hudson 11, 859 F.2d at 1420, 1423; Tyler, 98 Bankr. at 398; Straup, 90 Bankr. at
483; Smith, 83 Bankr. at 435; Thomas, 51 Bankr. at 188-89.
65. 77 Bankr. 120 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
66. See id. at 122-23.
67. Id. at 122.
68. Id. at 122-23.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 121. The creditor seeking relief inJackson was the City of Akron. The court
noted that the accident from which the damages to the city resulted had occurred five
months prior to the debtor's filing of the bankruptcy petition. Id. at 123. The court felt
that the City of Akron was not "dilatory" because it failed to bring a civil action against
the debtor within the five month period. Id.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (1988).
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arise "from a judgment or consent decree." If the lan-
guage of the revised statute is to be given any deference at
all, it would seem that as a preliminary consideration of the
invocation of nondischargeability pursuant to section
523(a)(9), the civil action must have at least been com-
menced in state court.72
The majority position has been rejected by the Bankruptcy Ap-
pellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit in Stackhouse v. Hudson (In re Hud-
son) (Hudson 1).73 The court, in its analysis of whether a prepetition
judgment or consent decree is required under section 523(a)(9), be-
gan with the language of the provision, finding it to be "clear and
unambiguous,"74 and refused to ignore the statute's explicit lan-
guage because of an aversion to drunk drivers. 75 Although the ap-
pellate panel shared the concern of the majority in not wanting to
permit drunk drivers to escape liability through a loophole found in
the poor draftsmanship of the provision, it held that the analysis of
the majority in permitting relief under section 523(a)(9) "without a
pre-petition judgment [did] not withstand scrutiny." 76
The Hudson I court found further clarity in the meaning and
intent of section 523(a)(9) in section 727(b) of the Code,7 7 which
sets forth the statutory allowances of discharge under the Code.78
Section 727(b) provides that "except as provided in section 523" a
debtor will be discharged from all debts arising before the date of
the order for relief, which is the same as the date that the bank-
ruptcy petition is filed by the debtor.79 The court noted that based
on section 727(b):
... the status of the claim at the date of the order for relief
determines whether the claim is or is not dischargeable
under any subsection of § 523(a). All claims that arose
before the commencement of the case are discharged, ex-
cept as provided for in § 523(a).
At the date of the order for relief, the [creditor] only
72. Jackson, 77 Bankr.. at 123 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (1988) (citations
omitted)).
73. 73 Bankr. 649, 654 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) rev'd, 859 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1988).
74. Id. at 653.
75. Id. "We are not free to disregard the plain language of the statute because of an
aversion to drunken drivers, an aversion we share with our brothers in [other] cases." Id.
76. Id.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988).
78. 73 Bankr. at 653.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988). Section 301 of the Bankruptcy Code defines "order
for relief" in a voluntary bankruptcy as occurring at the time the debtor files his or her
petition in bankruptcy. Id. § 301.
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had a claim against [the debtor], not a judgment or consent
decree.8
0
Therefore, the court held that the creditors' claim did not meet the
requirements of section 5 23(a)(9) because they did not have ajudg-
ment or consent decree against the debtor as required thereunder."'
Although the court's interpretation of section 523(a)(9) allowed the
debtor to escape liability for drunk driving under that provision, it
was compelled to "follow the [law] as written by Congress."-8 2 The
court stated that "[i]f, as some courts suggest, Congress erred in
drafting the statute, then Congress must enact legislation to correct
it.,83
Congressional ability to enact corrective legislation is perhaps
the court's strongest argument for a literal and strict interpretation
of section 523(a)(9). The court's position on this point of interpre-
tive license is courageous, particularly because a literal interpreta-
tion may allow a debtor to escape liability for drunk driving under
the provision. Nevertheless, the court is correct in acknowledging
the limitations of judicial interpretation by its choice to act within
the confines of its duty to interpret the law as written.
B. Hudson II: A Case of Judicial Interpretation or Legislation?
In spite of the well reasoned opinion of the court in Hudson I, it
subsequently was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.8 4
This reversal by the Ninth Circuit Court was not unanimous and
included a compelling dissent, which eloquently and persuasively
added to the arguments of the Hudson I court.8 5 The Hudson II ma-
jority's analysis of the statutory requirements of section 523(a)(9)
was premised on the "intent of Congress;"8 6 the court stated that
the most persuasive evidence of such intent is found in the "words
selected by Congress. 8 7 The court, however, offered very little in-
sight regarding the wording of section 523(a)(9) and what it be-
lieved the words of the statute revealed about congressional intent,
80. Hudson 1, 73 Bankr. at 653 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 654.
82. Id. at 653.
83. Id.
84. See Hudson II, 859 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir. 1988).
85. See id. at 1424-28 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1419 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1987)).
87. Id. (quoting Foxgord v. Hischemoeller, 820 F.2d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987) (quoting Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams v. Forsyth Energy, Inc., 666 F.2d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1981))).
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other than to read the statute as not "specifically address[ing]
whether a claim must be reduced to judgment or consent decree
before the debtor files for bankruptcy. '"88 Accordingly, the Hudson II
court did not base its interpretation on the wording of section
523(a)(9), but elected to follow the position of the lower bankruptcy
courts, as discussed in cases like Thomas8 9 and Ganzer.90 These cases
essentially dismissed the literal meaning of section 523(a)(9) to
"prevent drunk drivers from escaping liability by discharging debts
in bankruptcy ... "91
The Hudson H court held that the legislative history of section
523(a)(9), supported the interpretation that section 523(a)(9) did
not require a creditor to have a prepetition judgment or consent
decree against a debtor to be eligible for relief.9 2 To demonstrate
that Congress' primary concern in enacting 523(a)(9) was to prevent
drunk drivers from being able to escape liability for such conduct,
the majority opinion cited the testimony of Senators Danforth and
Heflin, and Representative Rodino.9' Senator Danforth stated:
"Today there exists an unconscionable loophole in the
bankruptcy statute which makes it possible for drunk driv-
ers who have injured, killed, or caused property damage to
others to escape civil liability for their actions by having
their judgment debt discharged in Federal bankruptcy
court. This loophole affords opportunities for scandalous
abuse of judicial processes." 94
The court then quoted Senator Heflin:
"Also contained in this package is a modified version
of a bill introduced by Senator DANFORTH which pro-
88. Id. at 1420 (emphasis in original).
89. Searight v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 51 Bankr. 187 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); see
supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
90. Thomas v. Ganzer (In re Ganzer), 54 Bankr. 75 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); see supra
text accompanying notes 53-55.
91. Hudson 11, 859 F.2d at 1420.
92. Id. at 1421-24.
93. Id. at 1421.
94. Id. (quoting 129 CONG. REC. S1622 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1983)). The court
continued:
... Sen. Danforth's references to "escap[ing] civil liability" and "scandalous
abuse of judicial processes" suggest that Congress was concerned less with
whether a judgment had been obtained against the debtor than with the under-
lying conduct giving rise to the cause of action .... Statements of other legisla-
tors bear out the contention that combating drunk driving, and not protecting
judgments, was the paramount concern -of Congress.
Id. at 1422.
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vides that a debt incurred as a result of an act of drunk
driving is not dischargeable . . . By making such debts
nondischargeable, we can protect victims of the drunk
driver and deter drunk driving ....
[T]his amendment [will] prevent the discharge ofjudg-
ments or claims where the debtor's operation of a motor ve-
hicle while legally intoxicated were to occur. 95
The opinion continued: "Rep. Rodino, Chairman of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, stated that § 523(a)(9) 'clarifies present
law relating to the nondischargeability of debts incurred by drunk
drivers. Debts incurred by. persons driving while intoxicated are
presumed to be willfully and maliciously incurred under this provi-
sion.' " Based on this testimony, the majority argued that Con-
gress was not that concerned about whether or not a prepetition
judgment or consent decree had been obtained against the debtor
as a prerequisite for nondischargeability.9 7
In its review of additional congressional testimony regarding
section 523(a)(9), however, the court also referenced the comments
of Senator Dole and Representative Sawyer, whose comments in-
cluded specific references to the fact that debts subject to nondis-
chargeability under the provision would arise from judgments.9"
Similarly, the court recognized that the Senate Judiciary Committee
Report accompanying the proposed amendment also referred to
such debts as arising out of judgments.99 Nevertheless, the court
dismissed these references to debts arising out of "judgments" as
being insignificant, and stated that the primary intent of Congress in
95. Id. (quoting 129 CONG. REC. S5362 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 576, 577) (emphasis added by court).
96. Id. (quoting 130 CONG. REC. H7489 (daily ed. June 29, 1984)).
97. Id.
98. The court referred to remarks by two legislators:
Two members of Congress did refer specifically to judgments. Sen. Dole said
the provision was intended "to ensure that victims of the drunk driver do not
have theirjudgments against the drunk driver discharged in bankruptcy." Rep.
Sawyer noted that "[j]udgments against drunk drivers for personal injuries ...
could be discharged in bankruptcy like any other judgment; now that is
prohibited."
Id. (quoting 130 CONG. REC. S8890 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) and 130 CONG. REC. H7492
(daily ed. June 29, 1984)) (citations omitted).
99. The court quoted the report, which was not submitted with the final legislation
but which accompanied the Omnibus Act at its introduction:
"Subtitle 'D' of the Committee bill is a modified version of S2159 (97th
Congress), a bill introduced by Senator Danforth which would render debts
incurred as a result of an act of drunk driving nondischargeable in bankruptcy.
Under present law, a debt that is the result of a tortious act-such as a judgment
against a debtor as a result of an automobile accident-is nondischargeable
[VOL. 49:156
1990] NONDISCHARGEABILITY OF DRUNK DRIVING DEBTS 175
enacting the new exception to discharge was to put "drunk driving
on the same legal footing as liability from a 'willful' act, which was
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6)."'' ° The court opined that
Congress supported the majority interpretation of section 523(a)(9).
The court based this conclusion on "Congressional silence;'''0 ' it
reasoned that because Congress had not voiced any objection to this
interpretation of section 523(a)(9), that it must have agreed with the
majority's "common-sense interpretation" of section 523(a)(9). 0
Although the decision of the Hudson II majority and the posi-
tion of the lower bankruptcy courts permits aggrieved creditors to
seek relief under section 523(a)(9) without a prepetition judgment
against the debtor, it is a decision that is problematic when consid-
ering the standard of review applicable when interpreting a stat-
ute.10 3 In a zealous effort to apply "common sense to the inartfully
drafted statute,"' t° the majority in Hudson H continued to perpetu-
ate the practice of the lower bankruptcy courts in rejecting the lit-
eral wording of section 523(a)(9).10 5 The dissenting opinion in
Hudson II offered the most compelling arguments against the major-
ity interpretation of section 523(a)(9) and a sound challenge against
this kind of judicial legislating.'0 6
The first issue addressed in the dissenting opinion concerned
the manner in which the Hudson II majority and the lower courts
interpreted congressional intent in the enactment of section
only if the debt is the result of a 'willful and malicious injury' to the property or
person of another ....
This bill will help deter drunk driving and protect victims of the drunk
driver, by making such debts non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. Where a debt
was incurred by the debtor as a result of an act of drunk driving, that debt will
not be dischargeable regardless of any court finding that willful, wanton, or
reckless behavior was or was not involved."
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 43-44 (1983)) (emphasis added by
court). The court continued: "The report uses the word 'judgment' as merely one ex-
ample of a nondischargeable debt. It manifests Congress' primary intent to put liability
resulting from drunk driving on the same legal footing as liability arising from a 'willful'
act, which was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6)." Id. at 1423.
100. Id. at 1423.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See supra note 25.
104. Hudson 11, 859 F.2d at 1424 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 1424-28.
106. See id. The dissenting opinion consists almost entirely of a direct quotation from
a "draft disposition" ofJudge Anderson, who heard oral arguments but died before the
court issued its decision. See id. "Judge Anderson has stated the reasons in his draft
disposition which I herewith adopt in relevant part." Id. at 1424.
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523(a)(9).' 0 7 The dissenting opinion stated that the reasoning be-
hind the lower bankruptcy courts' interpretation of the congres-
sional intent of section 523(a)(9) was "premised on presumed
congressional intent" and not the literal language of the statute.
10 8
The dissent also noted that the lower bankruptcy courts cited by the
Hudson II majority supported this interpretation and acknowledged
that the literal language of section 523(a)(9) required that a creditor
have a prepetition judgment or consent decree against the debtor
for nondischargeability.' 09
The points made in the dissenting opinion focus on the weak-
nesses in the majority's analysis and interpretation of section
523(a)(9). The Hudson II majority specifically stated that congres-
sional intent is found in the words selected by Congress in writing a
statute.110 Yet, it followed the position of many lower bankruptcy
courts that rejected the language of the statute to permit creditors
without prepetition judgments to seek relief under section 523(a) (9)
while simultaneously acknowledging that the words of the statute
are clear enough to indicate that a prepetition judgment is a re-
quirement for relief."'
Although Congress almost certainly did not anticipate that
debtors might attempt to avoid the consequences of nondis-
chargeability under section 523(a)(9) by filing petitions in bank-
ruptcy before a creditor could seek a judgment or consent decree
against the debtor from a court of record, it is not the responsibility
of the courts to intentionally misinterpret the statute to prevent
such avoidance." 2 To permit creditors without prepetition judg-
ments or consent decrees to seek relief under the provision when
the language of the provision does not provide for such relief is not
only an improper exercise ofjudicial interpretation, but is presump-
tuous for the courts to dismiss the significance that Congress specifi-
cally has defined the subject debt as one reduced to judgment or
consent decree by a court of record.' 13 By requiring that the debt
arise out of a judgment or consent decree issued by a court of rec-
ord, Congress defined the debt or claim as definite and having legal
107. Id. at 1424-27.
108. Id. at 1424 (emphasis in original).
109. Id. at 1424-26.
110. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
111. See Blackmer v. Richards (In re Richards), 59 Bankr. 541, 543 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1986); Thomas v. Ganzer (In re Ganzer), 54 Bankr. 75, 76-77 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985);
Searight v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 51 Bankr. 187, 188-89 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985).
112. See supra text accompanying note 25.
113. Id.
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certainty. This is not an unusual characteristic of the protected
debts that fall within the section 523 exceptions to discharge. The
debts that are nondischargeable under section 523 have significant
legal definition, either by statute, adjudication, or contract. Exam-
ples of the types of protected debts under section 523 include: tax
obligations; alimony or child support payments; legal fines or penal-
ties; and contract obligations, such as outstanding educational
loans." 4 Based on this common characteristic of section 523 excep-
tions, it was reasonable for Congress to require a creditor seeking
relief under section 523(a)(9) to have a claim reduced to ajudgment
or consent decree issued by a court of record.
The dissenting opinion in Hudson H made another compelling
point when it noted that the Hudson H majority and the lower bank-
ruptcy courts violated the "fresh start" principle of bankruptcy law
by interpreting section 523 (a)(9) in a manner that was favorable to
the aggrieved creditor."15 As the opinion emphasized, exceptions to
discharge are applied narrowly under the fresh start principle, and
are done so in a manner that is favorable to the debtor.
In determining whether a particular debt falls within one of
the exceptions of section 523, the statute should be strictly
construed against the objecting creditor and liberally in
favor of the debtor. Any other construction would be in-
consistent with the liberal spirit that had always pervaded
the entire bankruptcy system. 16
Like the court in Hudson I, the Hudson II dissent also agreed that
when section 523(a)(9) is read in conjunction with section 727(b) of
the Code, the meaning of the exception to discharge under section
523(a)(9) becomes even clearer."17 As noted above, section 727(b)
provides that a debtor who voluntarily seeks relief in a Chapter 7
liquidation will receive a discharge from all debts incurred before
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy "[e]xcept as provided in sec-
tion 523 . . .. "18 The dissenting opinion opined that because the
debt described under section 523(a)(9) was one that "arises out of a
judgment or consent decree," a creditor with a claim that had not
been reduced to a judgment or a consent decree did not have a debt
114. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1), (5), (7), (8) (1988).
115. See Hudson II, 859 F.2d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wiggins, J., dissenting); see
also discussion supra note 7 regarding the "fresh start" policy of the Code.
116. Hudson 11, 859 F.2d at 1425 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPrcY 523.05A at 523-16, 523-17 (15th ed. 1987)).
117. 859 F.2d at 1425-26 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
118. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988).
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eligible for relief as provided therein.'" 9 This point of statutory
construction, delineating the relationship between sections 523 and
727(b), was not addressed by the majority in Hudson H or by any of
the lower bankruptcy courts that the majority cited. This is a signifi-
cant omission by a court interpreting the question of nondis-
chargeability, as section 727(b) is the foundation for any
determination of dischargeability under the Code.'
20
The dissent also considered the relevancy of the legislative his-
tory of section 523(a)(9) in determining the congressional intent be-
hind the provision. 12 ' The dissent stated, as did the majority, that it
is the plain language of the statute that is conclusive of legislative
intent unless there is a "clearly expressed legislative intention" to
the contrary. 122 After reviewing the legislative history of the provi-
sion, the dissent concluded that nothing in the legislative history of
section 523(a)(9) indicated that Congress intended the exception to
apply to post-petition judgments or consent decrees.' 23 The court
noted:
Indeed, all discussion in the legislative history is specifically
directed at persons or families who have been the victims
of drunk drivers losing their judgments by reason of the
debtor's subsequent bankruptcy petition. If Congress had
wished to extend the coverage of § 523(a)(9) to encompass
post-petition judgments, it could have easily made clear its
intention to do so. As the Supreme Court has observed:
"When even after [going behind the plain language of
a statute in search of a possibly contrary congressional in-
tent] nothing in the legislative history remotely suggests a
congressional intent contrary to Congress' chosen words
.. . any further steps take the courts out of the realm of
interpretation and place them in the domain of
legislation." 24
The dissent's reading of the legislative history regarding section
523(a)(9) is correct. Moreover, all of the references to congres-
sional testimony cited by the majority included some reference to
aggrieved creditors having judgments or consent decrees against
119. Hudson 11, 859 F.2d at 1425-26 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
120. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988).
121. See Hudson 11, 859 F.2d at 1426 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985)) (emphasis in
original).
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the debtor.1 2 5
The dissent addressed the impact of a literal interpretation of
section 523(a)(9). 126 The dissent did not agree with the majority
that a literal interpretation of section 523(a)(9) made the provision
meaningless by encouraging debtors to race into the bankruptcy
courts to avoid liability for drunk driving debts.127 The dissent rea-
soned that there may be occasions when a debtor would want to
avoid filing a petition in bankruptcy, and that a debtor may elect to
defend an action against himself or herself for such liability. t28
More significantly, the dissent cited several cases brought under sec-
tion 523(a)(9) in which the debtor did not race to the bankruptcy
courts to avoid a civil judgment.1 29 In these cases, the creditors had
prepetition judgments or consent decrees against the debtor, and
125. See Hudson 11, 859 F.2d at 1421-23, quoted supra in notes 94-99. The Hudson H
majority dismissed the significance of these references to debts arising from judgments
in the congressional testimony by stating that the primary purpose of Congress in enact-
ing § 523(a)(9) was to prevent debtors from escaping financial liability for drunk driving
debts, and that Congress was not concerned with whether or not the aggrieved creditor
had a prepetition judgment or consent decree against the debtor. 859 F.2d at 1423.
This qualification of the significance of the references to "judgments" in the congres-
sional testimony is not substantiated by any of the testimony cited by the majority, id. at
1421-23, and thus, would appear to be a conclusion solely based on the opinion of the
majority. What the majority does in reaching this conclusion is rewrite the legislative
history to support its interpretation of the provision.
126. See Hudson H, 859 F.2d at 1426-27 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. The dissent stated:
Indeed, based upon the dire consequence envisioned by those who would view
a literal reading of § 523(a)(9) as rendering the statute nugatory, one would
expect never to see a judgment entered prior to the commencement of the
debtor's bankruptcy. Such is not the case. The statute on the contrary appears
to be functioning as contemplated by Congress. See, e.g., In the Matter of Brun-
son, 82 B.R. 634 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988) (pre-petition default judgment nondis-
chargeable); In re Bennett, 80 B.R. 800 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (pre-petition
default judgment nondischargeable); In re Christiansen, 80 B.R. 481 (W.D. Mo.
1987) (pre-petition judgment obtained but remanded to bankruptcy court for
causation determination); In re Keating, 80 B.R. 115 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987)
(pre-petition default judgment nondischargeable); In re Pahule, 78 B.R. 210
(E.D. Wis. 1987) (pre-petition judgment nondischargeable); In re Gomez, 70
B.R. 96 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (pre-petition judgment nondischargeable); ...
Dougherty v. Brackett, 51 B.R. 987 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) (pre-petition guilty,
plea restitution order, and promissory note constitute nondischargeable con-
sent decree); In re Coup, 51 B.R. 939 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (pre-petition
judgment obtained but debt dischargeable due to insufficient evidence of intox-
ication); In re Cunningham, 48 B.R. 641 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1985) (pre-peti-
tion judgment nondischargeable).
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thus demonstrated that section 523(a)(9) was effective as written., 30
In response to the majority's argument that a literal interpretation
of section 523(a)(9) may be offensive in allowing the quick-minded
debtor to avoid liability under the provision, the dissent argued that
aggrieved creditors who do not have prepetition judgments may in
the alternative seek relief under section 523(a)(6) if they can prove
that the injury sustained was the result of the debtor's willful and
malicious conduct. 13 ' As discussed above, creditors who have been
uncertain about their eligibility for relief under section 523(a)(9)
have sought relief for nondischargeability under section 523(a)(6)
and are encouraged to do so by the courts. 132
Perhaps the most critical reasoning behind the dissent's deci-
sion to interpret section 523(a)(9), as it is written, is the duty of the
judiciary to interpret statutes as written and not to rewrite them, no
matter how "inartfully drafted." The dissent stated:
[I am] aware that [my] application of the plain language of
§ 523(a)(9) may occasionally lead to objectionable conse-
quences for those injured by the deplorable and irresponsi-
ble actions of drunk drivers. This, however, is not a
sufficient basis for ignoring clear statutory language;'
"[T]he fact that Congress might have acted with
greater clarity or foresight does not give courts a carte
blanche to redraft statutes in an effort to achieve that which
Congress is perceived to have failed to do. 'There is a ba-
sic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence
and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and spe-
cifically enacted.' . . . Nor is the Judiciary licensed to at-
tempt to soften the clear import of Congress' chosen words
whenever a court believes those words lead to a harsh
result." 134
CONCLUSION
Section 523(a)(9) of the Code is an important and innovative
addition to the armory of legislation designed to discourage drunk
driving and to assure financial reparation for the drunk driver's vic-
tim. It is evident from the case history of section 523(a)(9) that the
130. See supra note 129.
131. Hudson 11, 859 F.2d at 1426 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 31-42.
133. Hudson H, 859 F.2d at 1427 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985) (quoting Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978))) (citations omitted).
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bankruptcy courts have been zealous to make the provision effec-
tive. As a result of such zeal, these courts have interpreted section
523(a)(9) in a manner that is contrary to the "literal language" of
the provision, and have based this interpretation on the "pre-
sumed" intent of Congress.
These courts have elected to misinterpret section 523(a)(9) to
overcome its weaknesses as an "inartfully drafted" statute. As sec-
tion 523(a)(9) is written, a creditor may seek relief thereunder, if he
or she has a prepetition judgment or consent decree against a
debtor for a debt incurred as a result of the debtor's operation of a
motor vehicle while legally intoxicated. The courts argue that Con-
gress could not have intended such a requirement because it would
deny relief to drunk driving victims who have not been able to ob-
tain a judgment or consent decree against the debtor before the
debtor files a petition in bankruptcy. These courts reason that this
requirement makes it desirable for debtors to race into the bank-
ruptcy courts before their victims are able to obtain a judgment or a
consent decree from a court of record to avoid nondischargeability
under section 523(a)(9).
Contrary to the belief of these courts, not all debtors are in-
clined to rush into bankruptcy for the purpose of avoiding the con-
sequences of section 523(a)(9). As noted in the Hudson II dissent,
bankruptcy courts have considered numerous nondischargeability
determinations under section 523(a)(9) in which creditors have had
prepetition judgments or consent decrees against debtors.
Although a literal reading of section 523(a)(9) does preclude credi-
tors who do not have prepetition judgments or consent decrees
against debtors from relief thereunder, the question surfaces
whether it is appropriate for courts to interpret this provision con-
trary to the way it was drafted by Congress. As recognized by the
Hudson H majority and dissent, a court must first look to the words
of a statute when rendering an interpretation, and then to the legis-
lative history if there is some ambiguity in those words or something
contrary in the legislative history. The wording of section 523(a)(9)
is relatively clear, and the legislative history does not suggest a
meaning contrary to the plain language of the provision. Moreover,
when section 523(a)(9) is read in conjunction with section 727(b)
and interpreted in accordance with the fresh start principle of bank-
ruptcy law, the literal reading of section 523(a)(9) is further substan-
tiated. While a literal interpretation of section 523(a)(9) makes a
nondischargeability determination of a drunk driving debt available
only to the creditor with a prepetition judgment or consent decree
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against the debtor, section 523(a)(6) continues to be a viable option
for such a determination for the creditor who was not able to obtain
the prepetition judgment or consent decree as required under sec-
tion 523(a)(9).
Accordingly, when interpreting section 523(a)(9) within the
confines of basic principles of statutory construction, a court should
conclude that a creditor seeking relief thereunder must have ajudg-
ment or consent decree against the debtor from a court of record at
the time the debtor files a petition in bankruptcy. If there are to be
any changes in the requirements of section 523(a)(9), they should
be made by Congress and not the courts. Perhaps the courts inter-
preting section 523(a)(9) in the future will follow the dissent in Hud-
son H and interpret section 523(a) (9) as it is written, and thus remain
within the "realm of interpretation" and not venture into the "do-
main of legislation."
